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Abstract
The aim of this study is to examine the effects of non-standard monetary
policy measures implemented by the Eurosystem on the Spanish banking
sector profitability. To do this, a new database is built merging data from the
Spanish Banking Industry Statistical Yearbook and from the Spanish Stock
Market Commission. Applying different econometric techniques to a panel of 54
Spanish banks that covers the period 2001-2017 and controlling for bank-specific
factors and macroeconomic conditions, no discernible impact is found between
the Eurosystem’s non-standard monetary policy measures (ECB’s total assets,
excess reserves and the slope of the yield curve) and bank profitability measured
as return on assets, pre-tax operating income and interest margins. This result
is robust to different specifications and to different groups of banks.
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1 Introduction
This paper evaluates whether the non-standard monetary policy measures implemented
by the Eurosystem have had any effect on the profitability of the Spanish banking
sector. Non-standard monetary policy measures commenced in the first half of
2008 as a response to the financial turmoil of the Great Recession. Their first aim
was to satisfy the urgent liquidity needs of depository institutions.1 In 2009 and
2010, the ECB introduced new unconventional measures which were complementary
to interest-rate decisions: one-year long-term refinancing operations (LTROs); a
covered bonds purchase program; and the first sovereign bond purchase program,
the Securities Markets Program (SMP) (Szczerbowicz, 2015). The sovereign debt
crisis forced the ECB to activate its SMP again and put in place a second covered
bond purchase program. Once there was no more room to cut interest rates, the
European monetary authority deployed a package of measures from 2014 onwards,
including credit easing measures, a third covered bond purchase program, an
asset-backed securities purchase program, a corporate sector purchase program,
and new targeted longer-term refinancing operations. Although Eurozone economies
started to grow, inflation did not reach the 2 percent target, so the asset purchase
program was prolonged several times until the end of 2018 (Hartmann and Smets,
2018). These non-standard monetary policy measures deployed by the ECB resulted
in an unprecedented expansion of its balance sheet (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Eurosystem total assets (emillion)
Source: ECB
1There are several types of non-standard monetary policies: quantitative easing programs,
negative interest rates, long-term refinancing operations and forward guidance.
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Given the scale of the measures, a plethora of studies have tried to identify
their effects in the Eurozone on output and inflation (Gambacorta et al., 2014;
Peersman, 2011), interest rates (Ambler and Rumler, 2019), bond yields (Abidi and
Miquel-Flores, 2018; Blot et al., 2019; Scotti et al., 2014), stock prices and exchange
rates (Haitsma et al., 2016; Scotti et al., 2014), financial stability (Heider et al.,
2018), wealth distribution of households (De Luigi et al., 2019) and on small and
medium-sized enterprises (Ferrando et al., 2019) among others.2
Non-standard monetary policies may also have affected the banking sector via
three main channels: the portfolio channel, the liquidity channel, and the signalling
channel (Bowdler and Radia, 2012). Their effects, however, remain unclear. On
the one hand, quantitative easing depresses long-term interest rates and flattens the
yield curve, which may reduce bank earnings on maturity transformation activities
(negative effect). It also hurts bank profitability when deposit rates are close to the
zero-lower bound, since financial institutions are reluctant to pass negative rates
through to commercial deposits (negative effect). On the other hand, quantitative
easing measures may generate capital gains because of the increased valuation
of bonds in bank portfolios and may lower the cost of debt (positive effect). In
addition, non-standard monetary policies may improve the macroeconomic outlook,
which may boost the demand for credit and reduce non-performing loans and loan
loss provisioning (positive effect). Results may depend on the country analysed
and the time-period chosen. In the USA, the findings of Montecino and Epstein
(2014) suggest that depository institutions that sold Mortgage-Backed Securities
(MBS) to the Federal Reserve increased their profits during the 2008-2009 period.
Chodorow-Reich (2014) estimates that the introduction of non-standard monetary
policies in the US in 2008 had a positive impact on financial institutions, with even
bigger effects on life insurance companies. Lambert and Ueda (2014) found that bank
profitability and risk-taking in the US banking sector are ambiguously affected by
non-standard monetary policies. In a similar vein, Lopez et al. (2018) investigated
the effect of negative nominal interest rates on bank profitability using a panel of
5,100 European and Japanese banks, determining that negative nominal interest rates
have a small effect on bank profitability. On the contrary, Mamatzakis and Bermpei
(2016) estimated that the Federal Reserve’s unconventional monetary policies had
a negative effect on US bank performance. In the Euro area, Acharya et al. (2019)
highlight that the 2012 ECB Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program could
indirectly recapitalize the European banking sector by influencing the prices of assets
held in bank portfolios. In particular, those depository institutions with a significant
quantity of bonds issued by Mediterranean European countries benefited the most.
Altavilla et al. (2018) studied the impact of both conventional and unconventional
Eurozone monetary policies on a sample of more than 50 banks, including eight
Spanish banks. They did not find any association between easing of monetary policy
and lower bank profits. The main difference between their research and mine is that
their data is only from 8 Spanish banks, hence the effects of the ECB’s non-standard
monetary policies on the profitability of the whole Spanish banking sector are still
unknown.
2See Dell’Ariccia et al. (2018) for a very-detailed summary of the effects of unconventional
monetary policies in the Euro Area, Japan, and the United Kingdom. See Kuttner (2018) for a
similar analysis in the United States.
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Amongst the different types of bank business models, the traditional financial
intermediation model predominates in Spain. Loans to the non-financial private
sector and deposits taken by the private sector account for a much higher percentage
of Spanish banks’ total assets than in other European countries (Maudos and Vives,
2016), so a significant number of households and companies meet their finance needs
via direct bank intermediation. The banking sector has always been particularly
important to the Spanish economy. In fact, the Spanish banking sector, and the
rest of the Eurozone banking system, are cornerstones of the Eurozone’s monetary
policy. Nowadays, financial institutions complain about the negative effects that
some non-standard monetary policies have on their profits. A sound banking sector
is crucial for a country like Spain. Spanish banks retain a critical role in direct
intermediation and can also be considered managers of financial risk. Effective
financial intermediation and sound financial institutions are clearly linked to a sound
economy (Camdessus, 1997). The impact of a financial system breakdown would be
huge and the associated fiscal costs of bailouts should be considered.
Non-standard monetary policies deployed by the Eurosystem could affect bank
profitability and hence financial stability and soundness (Altavilla et al., 2018).
Besides, the ability of banks to provide credit to other economic agents could be
hindered (Freixas et al., 2015). Therefore, this study tackles an issue hotly debated
in the media, trying to shed light on this relationship and offer new insights into
the fourth-largest economy of the Eurozone. This paper is a case study which
contributes to the literature about the impact of monetary policy actions on bank
performance. Understanding the effects of non-standard measures, especially their
potential negative impacts, has significant policy implications
The financial crisis hit Spanish commercial and saving banks directly and hard
enough that there were not only some bailouts, but also a massive restructuring of
the banking sector. On the one hand, some savings banks merged to create new
entities (e.g. Bankia, Abanca, Liberbank, or Unicaja). The rest, on the other hand,
were absorbed by the main Spanish commercial banks. This fact should be controlled
for in my investigation, so this paper differs from the rest of the literature by taking
non-consolidated data from 54 commercial banks into account and constructing new
‘virtual entities’ which capture the Spanish banking sector transformation process
and the impact of ECB actions on bank profitability.
Applying different econometric techniques and controlling for bank-specific factors
and macroeconomic conditions, no discernible impact is found from the ECB’s
non-standard monetary policy measures, as proxied by ECB total assets, excess
reserves, and the slope of the yield curve, on bank profitability, measured as return
on assets (ROA) and pre-tax operating income (PTOIR), over the 2001-2017 period.
This result is robust to different specifications and robustness checks. In addition, it
may be reasonable because of the effects of non-standard monetary policies on the
different components of bank profits. Further analysis shows that the previously not
discernible association between non-standard monetary policies and bank profitability
does not vary depending on different bank sizes, ratios of loans to total assets, or
short-term funding.
4
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of
the Spanish banking sector and how non-standard monetary policies could affect
bank profitability. Section 3 introduces the data set and variables employed in the
analysis. Section 4 discusses the methodology presenting the econometric framework
whilst section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 stresses the main findings.
2 The banking sector and non-standard monetary
policies
2.1 The Spanish banking sector: Some facts
Amongst all kinds of bank business models in developed countries, in Spain the
traditional financial intermediation model predominates. This is reflected in the
percentage of Spanish banks’ total assets made up by loans to the non-financial
private sector and deposits taken by the private sector, which is more than 10 percent
higher than the European average (Maudos and Vives, 2016).Therefore, because an
important number of households and firms meet their finance needs through direct
bank intermediation, the Spanish banking sector and the whole Eurozone banking
system are cornerstones of Eurosystem monetary policy. Before the Great Recession
and the sovereign debt crisis, the Spanish banking sector had remarkable weaknesses.
Maudos (2012) highlights that the creation of the European Monetary Union led to
a low nominal interest rate environment, with negative real interest rates in some
countries, which Spanish commercial and saving banks took advantage of. This
excessive liquidity was canalized through a significant increase in loans, not only from
commercial banks, but especially from savings banks. As Figure 2 shows, the ratio
of private sector loans to GDP rose from 89 percent in 2001 to 168 percent in 2008,
which implies that loans growth was higher than GDP growth. On the other hand,
loans grew more than deposits in the first half of the decade. Since 2008, however,
they have decreased to a greater extent than deposits. The loans-to-deposits ratio
fell from its peak in 2007 of 168 percent to 110 percent in 2017.
Before the real estate bubble burst, Spanish bank profitability, measured as return
on assets (ROA) or profits before tax to total assets, had always been, on average,
higher than the ROA of other European countries such as France, Germany, and
Italy (with a few exceptions). Figure 3 shows the quite important fact that, since the
recovery of the Spanish economy, bank profitability has never returned to pre-crisis
levels (0.8–1.1 percent). Since 2013, the ROA has oscillated between 0.0 percent
and 0.4 percent. Figure 4 shows that the interest margin of the Spanish banking
sector has followed a trend similar to ROA and has not returned to its previous level.
The financial crisis eroded bank interest margins and they have not recovered since.
Besides, the low nominal interest rate environment before 2007 caused households
and non-financial companies to start using leveraging. However, after 2007 some of
them started defaulting on their loans. On the contrary, the leveraging ratio of the
banking sector remained almost constant from 2001 to 2012, but it has increased
from then on.
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Figure 2: Loan and deposit indicators (in percentage)
Source: BBVA Research
Although the financial crisis affected both commercial and saving banks, the
latter almost disappeared. Their reckless behavior, partly explained by the presence
of public authorities on their boards of directors, led to excessive risk-taking
(García-Marco and Robles-Fernández, 2008). Those which did not go into bankruptcy
formed new entities or were absorbed by larger commercial banks. The financial
crisis provoked a tremendous consolidation of the Spanish banking sector and the
creation of new "super-banks".3
2.2 Bank profitability and monetary policy in the literature
The relationship between bank profitability and conventional monetary policy has
been studied since the 1940s. Samuelson (1945) emphasized that an increase in the
interest rate boosts bank profitability via an increase in bank interest margins. An
interest rate increase will push up the interest rates of loans to a greater extent than
the interest rates paid on bank deposits. The study of Hancock (1985) supports
this hypothesis. He estimated that the profit elasticity of loans is larger than the
profit elasticity of term deposits. On the contrary, Flannery (1981) found no clear
relationship between market interest rate levels and bank profitability, and showed
that large banks hedged against interest rate risks. Apart from the impact of
monetary policy on interest margins, interest rate changes may also affect the term
premium, altering the yield curve and thus bank profitability (English, 2002; English
et al., 2012). The study by Borio et al. (2017) confirms that the interest rate level
has a positive and significant relationship with both bank profitability and the slope
of the yield curve. In a similar line, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) found
that an increase in interest rate levels increases interest margins and profitability.
3For instance, the sum of the assets of Banco Santander, BBVA, Banco Sabadell and Bankinter
in 2007 accounted for 28.7 percent of Spanish banks’ total assets, whereas in 2017 they accounted
for 43.0 percent.
6
Figure 3: ROA by country (in percentage)
Source: BBVA Research and ECB
However, Lopez et al. (2018) show that, compared to low positive rates, negative
nominal interest rates have only a small effect on bank profitability.
On the other hand, the literature has established three different main channels
through which non-standard monetary policies – i.e. purchase of government bonds
from investors like banks or pension funds – may have an impact on the profitability
of the banking sector, especially via their effect on asset prices (Bowdler and Radia,
2012). The first is the so-called “portfolio rebalancing” channel. Tobin (1963, 1969)
and Brunner and Meltzer (1972) highlight that central bank asset purchases provide
cash to the owners of the assets. Since cash and the assets bought are not perfect
substitutes for each other, financial institutions will use that cash to buy closer
substitutes for previous assets, rebalancing their portfolios and taking more risks
than if they had just held the money. The second channel is the “liquidity channel”.
Quantitative easing reduces the net supply of longer-term assets which provokes an
increase in their prices and a decrease in their yields (Altavilla et al., 2018). The
provision of liquidity through asset purchase programs to not only the financial
sector, but also the non-financial sector, reduces the liquidity premia associated
with times of financial distress (Bowdler and Radia, 2012). Non-standard monetary
policies can also affect the banking sector via the “signalling channel”. The Global
Financial Crisis made forward guidance an essential tool of central bankers (McKay
et al., 2016). When the ECB reveals its possible future policy decisions, it signals
economic prospects to the market. Maintaining the asset-purchase programs for a
long period of time may signal that because the economic situation is still fragile
(Mamatzakis and Bermpei, 2016), there is an intention to keep short-term interest
rates low for a long period of time (Altavilla et al., 2018) and that long-term interest
rates may decrease (Bowdler and Radia, 2012). This mechanism is closely related to
the interest rate channel proposed by Samuelson (1945).
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Figure 4: Some bank indicators (in percentage)
Source: BBVA Research
Empirical studies trying to disentangle the different effects of non-standard
monetary policy on the profitability of the banking sector started with Lambert
and Ueda (2014) and Montecino and Epstein (2014). The first study showed
that bank profitability and risk-taking in the US banking sector are not really
affected by the Fed’s unconventional monetary policies (Lambert and Ueda, 2014).
The second one showed that depository institutions that sold MBS to the Federal
Reserve increased their profitability during the 2008-2009 period (Montecino and
Epstein, 2014). Mamatzakis and Bermpei (2016) estimated that the Federal Reserve’s
unconventional monetary policies had a negative effect on US bank performance.
In the Eurozone, once Altavilla et al. (2018) did not find any association between
monetary policy easing and lower bank profits once they controlled for the endogeneity
of the policy.
3 Data and variables
I constructed a new database employing annual data from the Spanish Banking
Industry Statistical Yearbook of the Spanish Banking Association for the period
from 1999 to 2017.4 However, the yearbook does not include all those new entities
created after 2010, most of which were created by mergers of troubled savings banks.
To ensure I included them in the sample, data from the Spanish Stock Market
Commission was employed (CNMV).
Some Spanish depository institutions are major global firms which are thus
exposed to different markets, not only inside the European Union but also in Latin
America and Asia. Since I am only interested in the effects of the ECB’s non-standard
monetary policies on the outcomes of Spanish banks, non-consolidated data is used.
4In the empirical models, data from 2001 to 2017 will be employed because there is no data
prior to 2001 for some country-level variables.
8
Consolidated data could distort my results because the balance sheets of headquarters
and subsidiaries may cancel each other out. The Spanish Banking Association reports
both non-consolidated (in Spain only) and consolidated data. The sample is adjusted
following Borio et al. (2017).I controlled for 47 mergers and acquisitions over the
1999-2017 period by constructing "new virtual entities" which are derived from
adding balance sheets (see Table A1 and A2 in the Appendix). This is key in the
Spanish context because there has been tremendous consolidation in the banking
sector since the beginning of the Great Recession. I am, however, conscious that this
method reduces the number of banks in the sample.5
The frequency is annual and all variables are in thousand euros. The final sample
includes 54 commercial banks6 and a total of 742 observations. Inconsistencies and
extreme values (outliers) have also been removed. The number of banks varies year
to year from a minimum of 35 to a maximum of 54 (with all new created entities
included).
3.1 Dependent variables
The data provided by the Spanish Banking Association and the Spanish Stock Market
Commission allows us to compute different bank profitability measures. The first one
is the return on assets (ROA), which is the simplest measure of bank performance.
It reflects the ability of a depository institution to obtain profits from its asset
management tasks. It is computed as the ratio of total bank profits before taxes
over total assets (Mamatzakis and Bermpei, 2016; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007;
Trujillo-Ponce, 2013). Profits before taxes are employed to avoid tax system changes.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the return on assets of some of the major Spanish
banks. Banco Popular suffered an important crisis in 2016 and 2017 that led to its
absorption in 2018 by Banco Santander.
The return on equity (ROE) is also another measure of profitability widely used.
Nevertheless, neither the Spanish Banking Association nor the Spanish National
Stock Market Commission provide me enough information to compute it over the
whole period considered. As a complement to ROA, the pre-tax operating income
to total assets ratio (PTOIR) will be employed (Mamatzakis and Bermpei, 2016).
Additionally, another measure used in the literature is the interest margin because
it is a momentous source of bank profitability (Mamatzakis and Bermpei, 2016).
5I have had to keep track of all changes in banks names during the 1999-2017 period. Table A3
in the Appendix provides a follow-up on this matter.
6Banks in the sample are: A&G Banca Privada, Allfunds Bank, AndBank España, Aresbank,
BNP Paribas España, Banca Pueyo, Banco Alcalá, Banco Europeo de Finanzas, Banco Finantia
Sofinloc, Banco Inversis, Banco Mediolanum, Banco Pichincha España, Banco de Depósitos, Banco
de la Nacion Argentina, Bancofar, Bank Degroof Petercam Spain, Bankoa, Banque Marocaine du
commerce exterieur international, Citibank España, Credit Suisse Ag, EBN Banco de Negocios, JP
Morgan Chase Bank National Association, Nuevo Micro Bank, Popular Banca Privada, Renta 4
Banco, Self Trade Bank, The Bank of Tokyo Mitsubushi UFJ, UBS Bank, Abanca, BBVA, Banca
March, Banco Caixa Geral, Banco Caminos, Banco Cooperativo Español, Banco Pastor, Banco
Popular Español, Banco Santander, Banco de Crédito Social Cooperativo, Banco de Sabadell,
Bankia, Bankinter, Caixabank, Deutsche Bank, EVO Banco, Ibercaja, Kutxabank, Liberbank,
Open Bank, Santander Consumer Finance, Santander Investment, Santander Securities Services,
Targobank, Unicaja and Wizink Bank.
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Figure 5: ROA of some of the main Spanish banks (Banco Popular right axis)
Source: Spanish Banking Association and Spanish Stock Market Commission
The interest margin is the difference between the interest rate of lending and the
interest rate of deposits. García-Herrero et al. (2009) highlight that the interest
margin is an appropriate measure of profitability if the behavior of banks is the one
which determines interest rate revenues and expenses and not government policies.
Although in the literature the net interest margin is computed as a percentage of the
average earning assets, I will employ the interest margin to total assets ratio (IMR)
because of data availability.
3.2 Non-standard monetary policy variables
Since the outbreak of the Great Recession, the ECB has notably expanded the size of
its balance sheet both in the asset and liability side. In the first place, by providing
liquidity to depository institutions. Secondly, by starting asset purchase programs
and holding Eurozone securities. The increase in the asset side of the ECB’s balance
sheet can be appreciated in Figure 6. In 2008 the ECB’s total assets were e2.075
trillion whereas in 2018, they are e4.702 trillion. Several studies have employed
the asset side of the central bank as a measure of non-standard monetary policies
to assess its effects on some macroeconomics variables. For instance, Gambacorta
et al. (2014) demonstrate that an exogenous increase in the central bank balance
sheet increases temporarily output and inflation and Eser and Schwaab (2013) study
the impact of the ECB’s Securities Markets Programme (2010-2011) on sovereign
bond markets. Using also this measure, Chodorow-Reich (2014) proves that the
introduction of unconventional monetary policies by the US Federal Reserve benefited
banks. However, Lambert and Ueda (2014) find that, in the US, bank profitability
and risk taking are vaguely affected by them. On the contrary, Mamatzakis and
Bermpei (2016) show that the increase in the asset side of Fed’s balance sheet has a
negative relationship with bank profitability. Hence, I use the logarithm of ECB’s
assets as a first measure of non-standard monetary policy measures.
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Figure 6: ECB total assets and Euro area banks excess reserves (right axis) (emillion)
Source: ECB
As in the case of the US (Keister and McAndrews, 2009; Todd, 2013), the
non-standard monetary policy measures carried out by the ECB have led to a
substantial increase in excess reserves held by Eurozone credit institutions (Darvas
and Pichler, 2018): from e0.966 billion in December 2007 to e1.204 trillion in January
2019 (see Figure 6). Excess reserves are those reserves held by credit institutions
at the central bank account in excess of the amount that the ECB requires. Since
the mid-2014, the ECB adopted a negative deposit rate on its deposit facility. As
Mamatzakis and Bermpei (2016), I employ the logarithm of excess reserves as a
second measure of the ECB’s non-standard monetary policy measures.
The ECB’s total assets and the Eurosystem’s excess reserves, are a proxy of asset
purchase programs (quantitative easing). They can proxy liquidity injections as well,
as the ECB expanded its balance sheet to provide long-term funding to euro area
banks. However, these measures are poorly correlated with forward guidance and
negative interest rates. This means that they are capturing the “quantity effect” of
non-standard monetary policies, but not the “price effect”. This "price effect" can
be measured by the slope of the yield curve. As in Altavilla et al. (2018), the slope
of the Spanish yield curve will be computed as the difference between the 10-year
Spanish bond yield and the 2-year Spanish bond yield.
3.3 Bank and country-level data
In the literature several variables have been used as controls. I will split these factors
that influence banks’ performance in two different categories: bank-specific factors
and macroeconomic variables which capture the Spanish economic conditions.
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3.3.1 Bank-specific factors
A natural variable to control for existing economies of scale is bank total assets
(proxied by bank size). The empirical evidence on the relationship between size
and profitability depends on the country and period analyzed. Some authors argue
that large banks tend to raise less expensive capital than smaller banks so they
can be more profitable (Short, 1979). Others argue that large banks gain from
being more diversified (Mester, 1993). On the other hand, large banks can also
be negatively affected by bureaucracy and other kinds of rigidities (Athanasoglu
et al., 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000). The natural logarithm of banks’
total assets is used. Another relevant variable to account for is the customer loans
to total assets ratio (García-Herrero et al., 2009; Mamatzakis and Bermpei, 2016).
To capture possible liquidity problems (Petria et al., 2015), the loan to customer
deposits ratio is used. Trujillo-Ponce (2013) argues that when there is an extreme
competition to capture deposits, depository institutions will increase the interest
rate they offer losing revenues. Hence, the annual growth rate of customer deposits
will be considered.
An additional control variable to be taken into consideration is market power.
The structure–conduct–performance hypothesis states that monopolistic profits are
derived from higher levels of market power. In the literature, market power is
proxied by taking the share of individual total assets to the whole sector total assets
(García-Herrero et al., 2009; Petria et al., 2015). I do the same here.7
3.3.2 Macroeconomic conditions
To capture the Spanish economic conditions I employ a set of macroeconomic
variables such as real GDP growth, inflation, stock market volatility and ECB’s main
refinancing operations (MRO) interest rate. A higher economic growth is related to an
increase of the demand for loans by households and firms (Petria et al., 2015), which
could be translated to a higher bank profitability. Economic growth is proxied by the
real GDP growth (Bikker and Hu, 2002; García-Herrero et al., 2009; Mamatzakis and
Bermpei, 2016; Avalos and Mamatzakis, 2018). An increase in the consumer price
index may affect not only wages but also other costs of financial institutions (Revell,
1979). Perry (1992) argues that if depository institutions anticipate inflation their
revenues will increase to a greater extent than their costs because they will adjust
properly interest rates. The opposite would happen if inflation is not unanticipated,
with its negative effects on bank profitability. Therefore, the effects of inflation in
bank performance are uncertain.
As in Lambert and Ueda (2014), the volatility of stock price index is used to
control for the stress in the stock market. Higher stock market volatility can negatively
affect bank performance. Finally, the ECB’s MRO interest rate is included to control
for the conventional monetary policy of the European monetary authority. A positive
relationship is expected on bank profitability (Jimenez et al., 2013), especially on
the interest margin variable.
7I would have also liked to control for other bank-level variables such as the liquid assets to
total assets ratio or a funding costs variable. Unfortunately, such variables are not included in the
Spanish Banking Association files.
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Table 1: Summary of variables. Definition and sources
Variable Definition Statistical Source
Dependent variables
Return of assets (ROA) Individual profits before tax per bank
over total assets per bank
AEB and CNMV*
Pre-tax operating income
ratio (PTOIR)
Pre-tax operating income over total
assets
AEB and CNMV
Interest margin ratio (IMR) Interest margin to total assets ratio AEB and CNMV
Independent variables
Eurosystem total assets
(ESTA)
Assets that the Eurosystem national
central banks and the ECB held at
the end of the year with third parties
ECB
Excess reserves (EERR) Reserves held by credit institutions
at the central bank account in excess
of the amount that the ECB requires
ECB
Slope of the yield curve
(SYC)
Difference between the 10-year
Spanish bond yield and the 2-year
Spanish bond yield
Bloomberg
Bank size (BS) Natural logarithm of total assets AEB and CNMV
Loans to assets ratio (LTA) Customer loans over total assets Own calculations
Loans to deposits (LD) Customer loans over customer
deposits
Own calculations
Deposits growth (DG) Customer deposits growth per year Own calculations
Market power (MP) Total assets per bank over the total
assets of the whole banking sector
BBVA Research
and own
calculations
Real GDP growth (RGDP) Real Gross Domestic Product change
per year
Eurostat
Inflation (INF) Change in the price index Eurostat
Volatility of stock price
index (VSPI)
Natural logarithm of the 360-day
standard deviation of the return on
the Spanish stock market index
Fed Bank of St.
Louis
Main refinancing
operations rate (MRO)
Interest rate depository institutions
pay when they borrow money from
the ECB for one week
ECB
Source: Author’s elaboration. *AEB stands for Spanish Banking Association. CNMV stands for
Spanish Stock Market Commission.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents a summary of the descriptive statistics of all variables employed in
the analysis.8 On average, bank profitability measured as ROA is 0.57, as pre-tax
operating income it is 0.74 and as interest rate margin it is 1.68. The large standard
deviations of the loans to deposits ratio and customer deposits growth are due to
the important changes in these magnitudes from some small banks from one period
to another.
8The correlation matrix is presented in Table A4 in the appendix.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Depedent variables
ROA 0.57 2.50 -32.99 16.81
PTOIR 0.74 2.0 -15.04 16.81
IMR 1.69 1.49 -0.51 10.76
Non standard monetary
policy variables
ESTA 14.44 0.54 13.58 15.31
EERR 9.23 2.89 6.50 13.83
SYC 1.57 0.67 0.19 2.62
Bank-level variables
BS 8.01 2.40 2.81 13.29
LTA 48.08 29.89 0.01 99.22
LD 327.15 2530.63 0.12 67339.38
DG 144.27 2221.96 -99.02 52310.39
MP 1.48 3.61 0.00 18.67
Country-level variables
RGDP 1.58 2.48 -3.57 4.11
INF 1.99 1.52 -0.50 4.08
VSPI 3.11 0.31 2.44 3.60
MRO 1.59 1.40 0 4.30
Source: Author’s elaboration. The final sample includes 742 observations (the same as in Table 5).
4 Econometric framework
The suitable econometric framework to deal with the data I use is a panel data
model. Firstly, a static-panel will be considered. In order to identify whether I
should employ a fixed-effects model or a random-effects model, the Hausman (1978)
test is performed. In the twelve estimated models, the null hypothesis is rejected.
This implies that the fixed effect estimator should be used.9
The static-panel model that I employ can be summarised by the following
expression:
BPi,t = c + β(NSMP)i,t +
n∑
j=1
γj(BSF
j
i,t) +
m∑
k=1
δk(MC
k
t ) + vi + ui,t (1)
In equation 1 subscripts i and t index banks and time in years, respectively; BPi,t
is the vector of bank-specific measure of the Spanish banks profitability. As stated
before, it has been proxied in three different ways: i) the ROA (return of assets),
ii) the PTOIR (pre-tax operating income ratio), and iii) the IMR (interest margin
ratio). The variable NSMPi,t captures the non-standard monetary policies and is
proxied by i) Eurosystem total assets, ii) excess reserves, iii) the slope of the yield
curve. The variable BSPji,t stands for bank-specific factors as described in Table 1
whilst MCkt stands for macroeconomic conditions, which do not vary across banks. β,
γj and δk are the rest of the parameters to be estimated. Finally, vi is the unobserved
bank-specific effect and ui the idiosyncratic error term.
9See Table A5 and Table A6 in subsection A.3 of the appendix.
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Secondly, I should be aware of the potential econometric issues that data could
present. The first one is the possible endogeneity character of the explanatory
variables. Bank profitability could have an impact on some of the bank-specific
variables as well as on macroeconomic determinants. For instance, some measures
adopted by the Eurosystem during the crisis have been partially a response to
problems in the banking sector. Hence, they may not be truly independent. The
second issue is the persistence of bank performance, a well-documented fact in the
literature (Knapp et al., 2006). Lastly, unobserved heterogeneity should be taken into
account (bank profitability can be affected by some features of depository institutions
which are not measurable). The standard methodology to address all my concerns
is to apply the generalised method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimator,
developed for dynamic panel data models by Arellano and Bond (1991) and improved
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) which yields consistent
and unbiased estimates.10 Specifically, I apply a two-step GMM system. This method
combines the difference equation with a level equation so as to form a system of
equations.11
The validity of the GMM system estimator approach relies on two different and
important assumptions: i) the instruments will be valid only if they are uncorrelated
with the error term, and ii) the GMM system estimator requires that the error terms I
have estimated are stationary. The first assumption will be tested through the Hansen
J-Statistics of over-identifying restrictions. In addition, the difference-in-Hansen test
will be performed. It considers whether the difference between the corresponding
Hansen statistics is small enough for the null hypothesis not to be rejected. The
second assumption implies the absence of second-order serial correlation in the first
difference residual. To test this assumption, I use an statistic developed by Arellano
and Bond (1991).
The dynamic panel model that I employ can be summarised in the following
expression:
BPi,t = c + α(BPi,t−1) + β(NSMP)i,t +
n∑
j=1
γj(BSF
j
i,t) +
m∑
k=1
δk(MC
k
t ) + vi + ui,t (2)
In equation 2 subscripts i and t index banks and time in years, respectively; BPi,t
is the vector of bank-specific measure of the Spanish banks profitability. BPi,t−1
denotes the dependent variables lagged one period. α measures the speed of mean
reversion. As Trujillo-Ponce (2013) underscores, a value of α between 0 and 1 implies
that bank profitability will ultimately come back to the equilibrium level. NSMPi,t
is the variable that captures the non-standard monetary policies. The rest remains
equal to equation 1.12
10Before applying the System-GMM approach, I will perform a dynamic fixed-effects model to
check whether the differences between both models are important.
11As the estimated asymptotic standard errors of the two-step GMM estimator may be downward
biased, I apply the finite sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005) to control for this.
12The endogeneity of instruments have been tested using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, resulting
negative.
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5 Empirical results
In this paper, I investigate empirically whether the non-standard monetary policy
measures of the Eurosystem have affected bank profitability in Spain with annual
panel of 54 banks during the period 2001-2017. Three different measures of bank
profitability are employed: ROA, PTOIR and IMR. The results need to be interpreted
with caution. Bank profitability may be affected by fiscal and financial factors I have
not controlled for.
In section 5.1, I conduct a static fixed-effects regression. In section 5.2, I move
from a static context to a dynamic one employing the same methodology as in the
previous section. Finally, in section 5.3, I use a system-GMM estimator.
5.1 Static fixed-effects estimation
Table 3 presents the first set of results of a static fixed-effects regression for the
three measures of bank profitability (ROA, PTOIR, and IMR) in Spain. Columns
"A" show the results using Eurosystem total assets as a proxy for non-conventional
monetary policies. Columns "B" present the outcomes employing excess reserves
as proxy. Columns "C" present the results using the slope of the yield curve as
proxy. Results for the three measures of bank profitability are presented in staggered
fashion. First, I directly regressed my interest variable with the measure of bank
profitability. Second, I controlled for bank-specific factors. Third, I also controlled
for macroeconomic conditions.
Starting with ROA (Columns 1A-3C) as proxy for bank profitability, none of
the coefficients of Eurosystem total assets are statistically significant. The results
are similar when using excess reserves or the slope of the yield curve, when I
control for bank-specific factors and macroeconomic conditions. Regarding the
PTOIR variable (Columns 4A-6C), when I control for bank-specific factors only,
a negative and significant association is found between ECB total assets and the
slope of the yield curve. Moreover, if macroeconomic conditions are added to the
equation, this relationship remains for Eurosystem total assets but changes its sign
for the other variables. Nonetheless, excess reserves do not seem to affect bank
profitability, measured as PTOIR. In the third set of regressions (Columns 7A-9C),
a positive association between excess reserves, the slope of the yield curve, and the
interest margin ratio is found after controlling for both bank-specific factors and
macroeconomic conditions.
Overall, employing a static-fixed effects methodology I cannot reject the null
hypothesis that non-standard monetary policy measures do not have an impact on
bank profitability. Although my analysis of the Spanish banking sector is new,
Lambert and Ueda (2014) did not find a conclusive association between bank
profitability and non-standard monetary policies in the case of the USA.
5.2 Dynamic fixed-effects estimation
The main drawback of the static fixed-effects model I employed for the previous
section is that the dynamics of bank profitability, which are regarded as quite relevant
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Table 3: Static fixed-effects estimations
Dep. variable: Return on assets (ROA)
Model 1A 1B 1C 2A 2B 2C 3A 3B 3C
Eurosystem
total assets
-0.030 -0.430 -0.209
(0.334) (0.302) (0.283)
Excess reserves -0.005 -0.038 -0.023
(0.052) (0.048) (0.062)
Slope of the
yield curve
-0.293** -0.325** 0.386
(0.133) (0.127) (0.261)
Bank factors No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro. cond. No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Within R2 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.026 0.021 0.029 0.046 0.046 0.047
F-statistic 0.01 0.01 4.864*** 8.641*** 9.050*** 14.20*** 11.47*** 11.48*** 11.62***
Dep. variable: Pre-tax operating income ratio (PTOIR)
Model 4A 4B 4C 5A 5B 5C 6A 6B 6C
Eurosystem
total assets
-0.280 -0.649*** -0.430**
(0.251) (0.215) (0.213)
Excess reserves -0.031 -0.050 -0.010(0.044) (0.038) (0.050)
Slope of the
yield curve
-0.340** -0.353*** 0.621*
(0.132) (0.127) (0.348)
Bank factors No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro. cond. No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Within R2 0.008 0.003 0.020 0.050 0.029 0.043 0.072 0.065 0.074
F-statistic 1.241 0.483 6.645** 19.50*** 19.74*** 24.04*** 23.14*** 21.77*** 23.97***
Dep. variable: Interest margin ratio (IMR)
Model 7A 7B 7C 8A 8B 8C 9A 9B 9C
Eurosystem
total assets
-0.384*** -0.266* -0.151
(0.141) (0.142) (0.131)
Excess reserves -0.050** -0.024 0.034**(0.023) (0.018) (0.016)
Slope of the
yield curve
-0.094 -0.046 0.372**
(0.074) (0.066) (0.141)
Bank factors No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro. cond. No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Within R2 0.070 0.033 0.007 0.098 0.083 0.079 0.119 0.120 0.130
F-statistic 7.42** 4.67* 1.62 10.55*** 10.87*** 10.32*** 8.19*** 7.73*** 10.09***
Observations 744 744 744 744 744 744 744 744 744
Banks in the
sample
54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
Source: Author’s elaboration. Notes: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively. In parentheses are presented robust standard errors clustered by depository institution.
Constant included but not reported.
in the literature, were not taken into consideration (Mamatzakis and Bermpei, 2016;
Trujillo-Ponce, 2013).
Table 4 reports the empirical estimations including the first lag of the dependent
variable (Dep.vart−1). All coefficients of the lagged profitability variables are positive
and statistically significant, confirming the dynamic character of the model and the
importance of controlling for this. There are only minor changes compared to the
static fixed-effects specification. When ROA is proxy for bank profitability (models
10A-12C), neither Eurosystem total assets nor excess reserves have any effect on it,
no matter which control variables are in play. Only the slope of the yield curve has a
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positive effect. In the case of PTOIR (models 13A-15C), outcomes do not differ at all
from Table 3. Finally, non-standard monetary policies’ effects on bank profitability,
as proxied by excess reserves, are positive and significant at one percent significance
level (model 18B) when bank-specific variables and macroeconomic conditions are
included for IMR.
Table 4: Dynamic fixed-effects estimations
Dep. variable: Return on assets (ROA)
Model 10A 10B 10C 11A 11B 11C 12A 12B 12C
ROAt−1 0.317*** 0.315*** 0.309*** 0.299*** 0.302*** 0.295*** 0.288*** 0.288*** 0.289***
(0.078) (0.078) (0.080) (0.077) (0.076) (0.078) (0.080) (0.079) (0.079)
Eurosystem
total assets
-0.100 -0.319 -0.236
(0.231) (0.237) (0.225)
Excess reserves -0.007 -0.022 -0.022(0.037) (0.035) (0.054)
Slope of the
yield curve
-0.180* -0.193* 0.435*
(0.105) (0.101) (0.229)
Bank factors No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro. cond. No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Within R2 0.105 0.105 0.108 0.115 0.112 0.115 0.128 0.127 0.129
F-statistic 8.433*** 8.194*** 13.33*** 37.76*** 32.94*** 33.59*** 43.12*** 39.60*** 46.79***
Dep. variable: Pre-tax operating income ratio (PTOIR)
Model 13A 13B 13C 14A 14B 14C 15A 15B 15C
PTOIRt−1 0.411*** 0.412*** 0.403*** 0.391*** 0.402*** 0.394*** 0.380*** 0.384*** 0.381***
(0.087) (0.084) (0.087) (0.086) (0.081) (0.083) (0.090) (0.088) (0.090)
Eurosystem
total assets
-0.238 -0.412** -0.333**
(0.158) (0.170) (0.156)
Excess reserves -0.019 -0.022 0.000(0.027) (0.025) (0.041)
Slope of the
yield curve
-0.182* -0.179* 0.541**
(0.098) (0.095) (0.261)
Bank factors No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro. cond. No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Within R2 0.213 0.208 0.212 0.225 0.215 0.219 0.234 0.230 0.236
F-statistic 22.11*** 13.94*** 23.35*** 80.76*** 68.40*** 73.12*** 60.53*** 57.37*** 62.99***
Dep. variable: Interest margin ratio (IMR)
Model 16A 16B 16C 17A 17B 17C 18A 18B 18C
IMRt−1 0.476*** 0.490*** 0.500*** 0.471*** 0.477*** 0.478*** 0.469*** 0.468*** 0.459***
(0.139) (0.132) (0.127) (0.144) (0.141) (0.140) (0.143) (0.140) (0.142)
Eurosystem
total assets
-0.150 -0.076 0.052
(0.119) (0.098) (0.099)
Excess reserves -0.020 -0.007 0.041***(0.017) (0.012) (0.012)
Slope of the
yield curve
-0.047 -0.023 0.155
(0.046) (0.038) (0.119)
Bank factors No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro. cond. No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Within R2 0.344 0.340 0.336 0.365 0.363 0.363 0.380 0.387 0.382
F-statistic 24.43*** 17.33*** 10.64*** 8.283*** 5.584** 5.281** 12.20*** 12.10*** 15.03***
Observations 744 744 744 744 744 744 744 744 744
Banks in the
sample
54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
Source: Author’s elaboration. Notes: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively. In parentheses are presented robust standard errors clustered by depository institution.
Constant included but not reported.
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5.3 System-GMM estimation
Table 5 reports the empirical estimations from equation 2, using the system-GMM
estimator.13 In this case, results are not reported in staggered fashion as in the static
and dynamic fixed-effects regressions. This is because the number of instruments
employed depends on the number of independent variables, so if I used a different
number of instruments for each regression, results would not be comparable. Before
commenting the results, the diagnostic test should be analysed. The post-estimation
diagnostic tests suggest the following: i) The null hypothesis of the AR(2) test
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) is that the errors in the first difference regression exhibit
no second-order serial correlation. The null cannot be rejected in any of the models;
ii) The Hansen (1982) J test is a test of the over-identifying restrictions. Under the
null hypothesis, there is no correlation between the instruments and the error term.
I cannot reject the null in any of the models. In addition, the difference-in-Hansen
test will has been performed. It considers whether the difference between the
corresponding Hansen statistics is small enough for the null hypothesis not to be
rejected. According to the results, the instruments are valid.
All coefficients of the lagged profitability variables (Dep.vart−1) are positive and
highly statistically significant, confirming the findings of the dynamic fixed-effects
model. The value of the lagged ROA is close to 0.20, indicating a low persistence in
bank profitability, while the value of the lagged PTOIR is almost 0.35, which can
be understood as a moderate persistence in bank profitability. In contrast, there is
a high persistence in the interest margin ratio variable, whose coefficient is around
0.75. Related papers have found similar results (e.g. Athanasoglu et al. (2008);
Trujillo-Ponce (2013)).
Once endogeneity issues have been properly controlled for, no association is
found between Spanish bank profitability, as proxied by ROA and PTOIR, and the
three measures of non-standard monetary policies (models 19A-21C). All outcomes
are in line with the static and the dynamic fixed-effects specifications. It is quite
reasonable to believe that the overall effect of non-standard monetary policies on bank
profitability is neutral. On the one hand, quantitative easing depresses long-term
interest rates and flattens the yield curve, which may reduce bank earnings from
maturity transformation activity. This clearly is a negative effect which may also
damage bank profitability when deposit rates are close to the zero-lower bound,
because depository institutions are reluctant to pass through negative rates to
commercial deposits, another negative effect. On the other hand, quantitative easing
measures may lower the cost of bank liabilities, not only increasing their net worth
but also relaxing their financial constraints. This may generate capital gains because
of the increased valuation of bonds in bank portfolios and may lower the cost of
debt, both positive effects. Besides, unconventional monetary policies may enhance
macroeconomic conditions, boosting the demand for credit and reducing the share of
non-performing loans, a positive effect.
13I am using from the second to the fifth lag as instruments for the difference and the level
equation. I am aware that the higher the number of instruments, the lower the validity of the
post-estimation diagnostic tests. As rule of thumb, I have limited the number of instruments to the
number of groups in the sample.
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Notwithstanding these findings, I found a positive and statistically significant
association (model 21B) between IMR and excess reserves. In fact, a one percent
increase in excess reserves is associated with a 0.04 percent increase in IMR.
Non-standard monetary policies such as quantitative easing flatten the yield curve,
which compresses net interest margins. However, non-standard monetary policies
mainly affect long-term interest rates, implying that the interest rates on loans
decrease more than the interest rates on deposits. In fact, deposit rates may stay
unchanged at the zero-lower bound. Because this result is counterintuitive, some
robustness checks were performed.
The literature does not provide conclusive evidence about the effects of non-standard
monetary policies and bank performance. Whilst Mamatzakis and Bermpei (2016)
estimate that the Fed’s unconventional monetary policies had a negative effect on
US bank performance, Lambert and Ueda (2014) do not find such effects. In the
Eurozone, no association has been found between monetary policy easing and lower
bank profits (Altavilla et al., 2018). My results follow this trend.
Table 5: System GMM estimation
ROA PTOIR IMR
Model 19A 19B 19C 20A 20B 20C 21A 21B 21C
Dep.vart−1
0.191* 0.195* 0.193** 0.346*** 0.322*** 0.348*** 0.768*** 0.751*** 0.740***
(0.100) (0.104) (0.093) (0.127) (0.125) (0.131) (0.118) (0.132) (0.122)
Eurosystem
total assets
0.006 -0.267 0.037
(0.422) (0.257) (0.077)
Excess reserves 0.000 -0.002 0.045***(0.066) (0.046) (0.013)
Slope of the
yield curve
0.331 0.479 0.130
(0.276) (0.313) (0.099)
Bank factors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro. cond. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR1 (p-value) 0.056 0.057 0.052 0.027 0.030 0.030 0.001 0.003 0.001
AR2 (p-value) 0.195 0.195 0.180 0.259 0.273 0.258 0.250 0.682 0.344
Hansen (p-val.) 0.608 0.510 0.475 0.296 0.589 0.296 0.412 0.273 0.375
Difference
Hansen-test
0.734 0.434 0.491 0.946 0.999 0.845 0.664 0.732 0.723
Wald test 31.59*** 41.68*** 23.06*** 37.77*** 47.49*** 43.78*** 273.8*** 248.5*** 373.6***
Observations 742 742 742 742 742 742 742 742 742
Banks in the
sample
54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
Source: Author’s elaboration. Notes: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively. In parentheses are presented robust standard errors clustered by depository institution
(corrected by the finite sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005)). Constant included but
not reported.
5.4 Robustness analysis
There may be several reasons to explain the previous findings. It may be an
omitted-variable bias. In other words, the model is not properly controlling for
bank-specific factors and macroeconomic conditions. A second reason may be that
the non-conventional monetary policy measures deployed by the ECB affect each
bank in a different way depending on their economies of scale or financial structure.
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The results could also be driven by the creation of new entities as a consequence
of the restructuring process of the Spanish banking sector or by the creation of
“new virtual entities”. I will try to shed light to these issues in the present section,
conducting some robustness checks. Finally, non-standard monetary policies may
have both positive and negative effects, compensating each other. Trying to isolate
this kind of effects may be quite complicated and it is beyond the scope of this paper.
5.4.1 New control variables
Trying to capture a possible omitted-variable bias, the system-GMM equation is
re-estimated. To do this, I add some variables increasing the number of regressors.
Firstly, Athanasoglu et al. (2008) and Trujillo-Ponce (2013) highlight that the
relationship between size and profitability may be non-linear. Therefore, the natural
logarithm of banks’ total assets and their square (BS2) is used to control for this
fact. On the other hand, the Great Recession was followed by far-reaching normative
and policy changes specifically targeting the banking sector, both internationally and
at the national level. At international level, for example, the capital conservation
buffer is applied from January 1, 2015, in Spain. The range goes from 0 per cent in
1999-2015, to 0.625 percent in 2016 and 1.25 percent in 2017. At national level, the
Spanish saving banks were bailed out in 2012. This bailout was accompanied by a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which led to more significant provisioning
by Spanish banks, a new reform of the saving banks, higher solvency requirements,
and the creation of a “bad bank” (the SAREB) (Maudos and Vives, 2016). This will
be captured by a dummy variable.
Table 6 reports the empirical estimations using the system-GMM estimator. As
in the previous section, all post-estimation diagnostic tests (AR(2) test, Hansen test
and difference Hansen-test) suggest that the instruments I am using are valid. In
this new specification, some of the independent variables have not only the same
sign but also the same statistical significance as in Table 5.
The coefficients of the non-standard monetary policies are not statistically
significant when profitability is defined in terms of ROA and PTOIR. Nevertheless,
there is a major change with respect to Table 5. When it is controlled for the square
of the natural logarithm of banks’ total assets and for regulation, there is not a
statistically significant association (model 24B) between IMR and excess reserves.
This result is in line with the outcomes of Altavilla et al. (2018).
5.4.2 Heterogeneous effects
The non-conventional monetary policy measures deployed by the ECB may affect
each bank in a heterogeneous way depending on their economies of scale, financial
structure, or funding. So as to deal with this, I will perform some regressions taking
into account these characteristics.
First, banks will be classified into three different categories with respect to the
level of total assets (bank size): depository institutions in the fourth quartile or
"small banks" (4thq.BS), banks in the third and the second quartile or "middle size
banks" (med.BS), and banks in the first quartile or "big banks" (1stq.BS). As an
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Table 6: System GMM with new regressors
ROA PTOIR IMR
Model 22A 22B 22C 23A 23B 23C 24A 24B 24C
Dep.vart−1
0.202* 0.196* 0.203** 0.345*** 0.327*** 0.350*** 0.772*** 0.771*** 0.763***
(0.109) (0.114) (0.096) (0.123) (0.115) (0.122) (0.124) (0.125) (0.125)
Eurosystem
total assets
-0.079 -0.491 -0.001
(0.348) (0.330) (0.129)
Excess reserves 0.159 0.090 0.019(0.288) (0.214) (0.086)
Slope of the
yield curve
0.312 0.488* 0.089
(0.286) (0.266) (0.113)
Bank factors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro. cond. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR1 (p-value) 0.055 0.056 0.052 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.001 0.001 0.001
AR2 (p-value) 0.210 0.236 0.190 0.262 0.307 0.261 0.370 0.428 0.497
Hansen (p-val.) 0.862 0.825 0.938 0.708 0.856 0.756 0.764 0.691 0.744
Difference
Hansen-test
0.988 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Wald test 50.82*** 50.21*** 36.30*** 82.63*** 108.3*** 64.93*** 550.5*** 464.2*** 498.7***
Observations 742 742 742 742 742 742 742 742 742
Banks in the
sample
54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
Source: Author’s elaboration. Notes: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively. In parentheses are presented robust standard errors clustered by depository institution
(corrected by the finite sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005)). Constant included but
not reported.
arbitrary measure to classify banks, the year 2015 will be used, a year in which
the maximum number of banks are present in the sample. A dummy variable will
be created for the small14, the big banks group15, and the middle size group.16
Then, I will interact the non-standard monetary policy variables with the dummy
variable of each group. Table 7 reports the empirical estimations (the square of the
logarithm of total assets and financial regulation variables haven been included). The
post-estimation diagnostic tests suggest that the instruments employed are valid.
Some interesting facts arise. The coefficients of the interaction between non-standard
monetary policies measured as excess reserves (EERR) and all groups and bank
profitability are not statistically significant. This implies that no association has
been found when non-standard monetary policies are captured by excess reserves. In
the same way, when they are captured by the slope of the yield curve (SYC), no effect
is found with respect to ROA, PTOIR and IMR. On the contrary, non-standard
monetary policies proxied by the Eurosystem total assets seems to affect negatively
at 10 percent significance level bank profitability captured through PTOIR for banks
14The "small banks" group is composed by the following 13 banks: A&G Banca Privada, AndBank
España, BNP Paribas España, Banco Alcalá, Banco Europeo de Finanzas, Banco Finantia Sofinloc,
Banco Pichincha España, Banco de Depósitos, Banco de la Nacion Argentina, Bank Degroof
Petercam Spain, Banque Marocaine du commerce exterieur international, Citibank España and
Self Trade Bank.
15The "big banks" group is composed by the following 14 banks: Abanca, BBVA, Banco
Cooperativo Español, Banco Popular Español, Banco Santander, Banco de Sabadell, Bankia,
Bankinter, Caixabank, Ibercaja, Liberbank, Santander Consumer Finance and Unicaja.
16The "middle size banks" group is composed by the rest of the depository institutions.
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Table 7: System GMM estimation based on total assets classification
ROA PTOIR IMR
Model 25A 25B 25C 26A 26B 26C 27A 27B 27C
Dep.vart−1
0.243** 0.196* 0.203** 0.414*** 0.376*** 0.335** 0.798*** 0.782*** 0.759***
(0.104) (0.102) (0.089) (0.117) (0.111) (0.130) (0.098) (0.120) (0.106)
ESTA× 4thq.BS -0.358 -0.555 -0.016(0.363) (0.365) (0.102)
ESTA×med.BS -0.561 -0.697* -0.049(0.399) (0.395) (0.116)
ESTA× 1stq.BS -0.637 -0.709 -0.022(0.478) (0.496) (0.137)
EERR× 4thq.BS 0.281 0.148 0.026(0.291) (0.244) (0.079)
EERR×med.BS 0.280 0.161 0.012(0.325) (0.268) (0.073)
EERR× 1stq.BS 0.234 0.157 0.033(0.332) (0.247) (0.086)
SYC× 4stq.BS 0.571 0.500 0.080(0.457) (0.442) (0.181)
SYC×med.BS 0.335 0.348 0.016(0.246) (0.244) (0.150)
SYC× 1stq.BS 0.401 0.382 0.077(0.251) (0.246) (0.117)
Bank factors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro. cond. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR1 (p-value) 0.047 0.051 0.049 0.019 0.019 0.031 0.001 0.001 0.001
AR2 (p-value) 0.169 0.237 0.186 0.231 0.286 0.277 0.444 0.603 0.608
Hansen (p-val.) 0.831 0.702 0.888 0.701 0.697 0.814 0.622 0.461 0.430
Difference
Hansen-test
0.790 0.680 0.986 0.898 0.884 0.992 0.998 0.948 0.908
Wald test 43.56*** 63.80*** 27.43*** 76.11*** 132.4*** 146.1*** 901.4*** 802.7*** 575.4***
Observations 742 742 742 742 742 742 742 742 742
Banks in the
sample
54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
Source: Author’s elaboration. Notes: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively. In parentheses are presented robust standard errors clustered by depository institution
(corrected by the finite sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005)). Constant included but
not reported.
which belong to the middle size group. Nonetheless, it is not enough evidence to
claim that there is any effect. Hence, I should rule out that the previous findings are
driven by the chosen year to classify depository institutions. Therefore, I re-estimate
the baseline equation taking into account the quartile distribution in 2014 and 2016.
Although some banks move from one group to another, the results presented in
Table 7 are completely robust: no evidence is found about the relationship between
non-standard monetary policies and Spanish banking sector profitability when it
is captured through ROA or PTOIR. Results concerning interest margin are also
robust.17
In Spain, a huge number of households and companies meet their financing needs
through direct bank intermediation. Therefore, loans tend to be an important part of
the assets of Spanish banks and a remarkable source of revenues (Maudos and Vives,
17Results are available upon request.
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2016). Depository institutions will be classified into the same categories as before but
depending on the level of their loan to total assets ratio (LTA): depository institutions
in the fourth quartile or "low level of loans to total assets group" (4thq.LTA), banks
in the third and the second quartile (med.LTA), and banks in the first quartile or
"high level of loans to total assets group" (1stq.LTA). The year 2015 is taken to
classify banks. A dummy variable will be created for the low level of loans to total
assets group18, for the high level of loans to total assets group19 and the remaining
depository institutions belong to the middle level of loans to total assets group.
Table 8 reports the empirical estimations.20 In models 28A, 28B, 29B, 30A, 30B
and 30C, no evidence is found of heterogeneous effects of non-standard monetary
policies on bank profitability as a function of loan to total assets ratio. Instead, the
coefficient of non-standard monetary policies captured through the slope of the yield
curve and both ROA and PTOIR of depository institutions in the first quartile is
positive and statistically significant at 10 percent. This is not enough evidence to
claim that there is a strong relationship between non-standard monetary policies
and bank profitability of the Spanish banking sector. Once I re-estimate the baseline
equation to discard that results are driven by the chosen year, the outcomes remain
without changes.21
Third, the funding structure of Spanish banks can be a relevant determinant.
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) argue that those depository institutions which
rely more on short-term funding -deposits- tend to suffer less from the risks derived
from liquidity problems. Hence, depository institutions will be classified into the
same categories as before but depending on the level of their deposits to total assets
ratio (DTA). The year 2015 is taken to classify banks. A dummy variable will
be created for the low level of deposits to total assets group (4thq.DTA)22, for the
high level of deposits to total assets group (1stq.DTA)23, and for the medium level
(med.DTA).24
18The low level of loans to total assets group is composed by the following 13 banks: Allfunds
Bank, Banco Cooperativo Español, Banco Europeo de Finanzas, Banco Finantia Sofinloc, Banco
Mediolanum, Banco de Crédito Social Cooperativo, Banco de la Nación Argentina, Citibank, EBN
Banco de Negocios, Open Bank, Popular Banca Privada, Santander Securities Services and Self
Trade Bank.
19The high level of loans to total assets group is composed by the following 13 banks: A&G
Banca Privada, BNP Paribas, Banco Cetelem, Banco de Sabadell, Bancofar, Bankinter, Bankia,
Caixabank, Deutsche Bank, Kutxabank, Nuevo Micro Bank, Gargobank and The Bank of Tokyo
Mitsubushi UFJ.
20The number of instruments employed in the system-GMM is exactly the same as in Table 5.
21Results are available upon request.
22The low level of deposits to total assets group is composed by the following 13 banks: Allfunds
Bank, Aresbank, Banco Cetelem, Banco Europeo de Finanzas, Banco de Crédito Social Cooperativo,
Banco de la Nación Argentina, Banque Marocaine du commerce exterieur international, Citibank
España, EBN Banco de Negocios, JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association, Nuevo Micro
Bank, Santander Consumer Finance and The Bank of Tokyo Mitsubushi UFJ LTD.
23The high level of deposits to total assets group is composed by the following 14 banks: Banca
March, Banca Pueyo, Banco Inversis, Banco Mediolanum, Banco Pastor, Banco Pichincha España,
Bankia, Liberbank, Open Bank, Popular Banca Privada, Santander Securities Services, Self Trade
Bank, Targobank and Unicaja.
24The medium level of deposits to total assets group is composed by the rest of the depository
institutions.
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Table 8: System GMM estimation based on loan to total assets classification
ROA PTOIR IMR
Model 28A 28B 28C 29A 29B 29C 30A 30B 30C
Dep.vart−1
0.193** 0.179* 0.192** 0.334*** 0.312*** 0.338*** 0.730*** 0.767*** 0.686***
(0.091) (0.106) (0.096) (0.119) (0.111) (0.125) (0.122) (0.127) (0.113)
ESTA× 4thq.LTA0.031 -0.362 0.087(0.399) (0.279) (0.108)
ESTA×med.LTA-0.101 -0.421 0.023(0.392) (0.276) (0.104)
ESTA× 1stq.LTA-0.155 -0.461* 0.028(0.398) (0.279) (0.107)
EERR× 4thq.LTA 0.356 0.275 0.057(0.281) (0.252) (0.100)
EERR×med.LTA 0.240 0.180 0.037(0.250) (0.230) (0.089)
EERR× 1stq.LTA 0.160 0.099 0.014(0.226) (0.203) (0.087)
SYC× 4stq.LTA 0.763* 0.813* 0.148(0.434) (0.431) (0.143)
SYC×med.LTA 0.169 0.334 -0.010(0.317) (0.278) (0.136)
SYC× 1stq.LTA 0.188 0.145 -0.009(0.355) (0.313) (0.131)
Bank factors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro. cond. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR1 (p-value) 0.060 0.064 0.057 0.031 0.030 0.033 0.00181 0.001 0.001
AR2 (p-value) 0.215 0.247 0.203 0.237 0.313 0.277 0.495 0.493 0.477
Hansen (p-val.) 0.996 0.993 0.998 0.976 0.969 0.943 0.976 0.936 0.771
Difference
Hansen-test
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Wald test 57.22*** 46.63*** 58.10*** 74.79*** 91.37*** 80.34*** 543.9*** 624.7*** 412.4***
Observations 742 742 742 742 742 742 742 742 742
Banks in the
sample
54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
Source: Author’s elaboration. Notes: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively. In parentheses are presented robust standard errors clustered by depository institution
(corrected by the finite sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005)). Constant included but
not reported.
Table 9 shows the results. Non-standard monetary policies captured through
excess reserves do not seem to affect any of the bank profitability measures. When
non-standard monetary policy measures are proxied by the Eurosystem total assets,
a 5 percent statistically significance association is found between them and PTOIR
for those banks which belong to the medium level of deposits to total assets (second
and third quartile) group and to the high level of deposits to total assets group
(first quartile). When they are proxied by the slope of the yield curve, a 10 percent
statistically significance association is found between them and ROA and PTOIR for
the fourth quartile group of banks. Nevertheless, these relationships vanish if the
chosen year changes.25 Therefore, none of the standard monetary policy measures
are statistically significant.
25Results available upon request.
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Table 9: System GMM Estimation based on deposits to total assets classification
ROA PTOIR IMR
Model 31A 31B 31C 32A 32B 32C 33A 33B 33C
Dep.vart−1
0.224** 0.204** 0.192** 0.375*** 0.353*** 0.312*** 0.745*** 0.733*** 0.746***
(0.098) (0.096) (0.088) (0.123) (0.111) (0.118) (0.104) (0.109) (0.121)
ESTA× 4thq.DTA0.027 -0.196 -0.042(0.133) (0.125) (0.048)
ESTA×med.DTA-0.114 -0.294** -0.071(0.162) (0.131) (0.050)
ESTA× 1stq.DTA-0.137 -0.284** -0.066(0.144) (0.129) (0.044)
EERR× 4thq.DTA 0.082 0.005 -0.011(0.155) (0.120) (0.040)
EERR×med.DTA -0.122 -0.152 -0.034(0.149) (0.142) (0.053)
EERR× 1stq.DTA -0.105 -0.119 -0.040(0.143) (0.125) (0.045)
SYC× 4stq.DTA 0.755* 0.676* 0.075(0.436) (0.401) (0.101)
SYC×med.DTA 0.118 0.114 -0.014(0.318) (0.231) (0.181)
SYC× 1stq.DTA 0.184 0.318 -0.066(0.255) (0.282) (0.142)
Bank factors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro. cond. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR1 (p-value) 0.047 0.049 0.051 0.019 0.020 0.027 0.001 0.001 0.001
AR2 (p-value) 0.174 0.173 0.178 0.229 0.225 0.283 0.473 0.524 0.712
Hansen (p-val.) 0.865 0.818 0.967 0.894 0.716 0.780 0.537 0.474 0.578
Difference
Hansen-test
0.775 0.993 1.000 1.000 0.990 0.978 0.829 0.918 0.890
Wald test 60.97*** 40.06*** 41.40*** 138.9*** 279.4*** 120.5*** 747.2*** 511.0*** 608.2***
Observations 742 742 742 742 742 742 742 742 742
Banks in the
sample
54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
Source: Author’s elaboration. Notes: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively. In parentheses are presented robust standard errors clustered by depository institution
(corrected by the finite sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005)). Constant included but
not reported.
5.4.3 Without new entities
Finally, in order to avoid that the results are driven by the creation of new entities as
a consequence of the restructuring process of the Spanish banking sector, I exclude
the following banks from the sample: Abanca (2011), Banco de Crédito Social
Cooperativo (2014), Bankia (2011), Caixabank (2010), Ibercaja (2011), Kutxabank
(2012), Liberbank (2011), Unicaja (2011). All of the previous banks were created
merging savings banks in different regions of the Spanish geography. Table 10 reports
the empirical estimations for this new sample using the system-GMM estimator.
The main results do not differ from those reported in Table 5. The first lag of all
profitability variables is statistically significant and non-standard monetary policies
do not seem to have any effect on bank profitability when it is proxied by ROA,
PTOIR or the interest margin.
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Table 10: Excluding new entities. System GMM estimation
ROA PTOIR IMR
Model 34A 34B 34C 35A 35B 35C 36A 36B 36C
BPt−1
0.210** 0.211* 0.211* 0.397*** 0.412*** 0.403*** 0.780*** 0.793*** 0.775***
(0.107) (0.111) (0.115) (0.124) (0.131) (0.120) (0.120) (0.110) (0.113)
Eurosystem
Total Assets
0.106 -0.184 -0.067
(0.404) (0.241) (0.112)
Excess
Reserves
0.258 0.239 0.011
(0.324) (0.254) (0.099)
Slope of the
yield curve
0.067 0.200 0.115
(0.269) (0.208) (0.121)
Bank factors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro. cond. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR1 (p-value) 0.076 0.077 0.076 0.058 0.055 0.056 0.001 0.001 0.001
AR2 (p-value) 0.203 0.214 0.209 0.194 0.205 0.193 0.186 0.184 0.189
Hansen (p-val.) 0.961 0.952 0.991 0.897 0.918 0.805 0.893 0.857 0.925
Difference
Hansen-test
0.998 0.993 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.909 0.947 0.999
Wald test 48.15*** 60.48*** 60.67*** 116.7*** 119.3*** 103.3*** 426.5*** 380.3*** 343.2***
Observations 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 659 659
Banks in the
sample
46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
Source: Author’s elaboration. Notes: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively. In parentheses are presented robust standard errors clustered by depository institution
(corrected by the finite sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005). Constant included but
not reported.
6 Conclusion
The traditional financial intermediation model predominates in Spain. This feature
makes the Spanish banking sector, along with the rest of the Euro area banking system,
cornerstones of the Eurosystem monetary policy. However, although the financial
crisis eroded Spanish bank profitability, it has not recovered, on average, since
then. Financial institutions attribute this to negative effects that some non-standard
monetary policies may have on their profits. A sound banking sector is crucial for a
developed economy. In fact, effective financial intermediation and sound financial
institutions are clearly linked to a healthy economy (Camdessus, 1997). Hence, this
paper empirically investigates whether the non-standard monetary policy measures
implemented by the Eurosystem have affected the profitability of the Spanish banking
sector. Understanding these effects, especially their potential negative impact, has
important policy implications.
Controlling for bank-specific factors and macroeconomic conditions, no effect
of non-standard monetary policy measures on bank profitability is found through
Eurosystem total assets, excess reserves, or the yield curve slope. This can be
explained by the different positive and negative impacts of non-standard monetary
policies on bank profitability. Quantitative easing measures lower the cost of bank
liabilities, not only increasing their net worth but also relaxing their financial
constraints. In addition, capital gains may be generated by the increased valuation
of bonds in bank portfolios, which may lower the cost of debt and improve the
macroeconomic outlook, which may boost the demand for credit and reduce non-performing
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loans and loan loss provisioning (positive effects). Nonetheless, quantitative easing
depresses long-term interest rates and flattens the yield curve, reducing bank earnings
from maturity transformation activity. It can also damage bank profitability when
deposit rates are near the zero-lower bound, because financial institutions may be
reluctant to pass through negative rates to commercial deposits, at least in Spain.
The neutral result is robust to different specifications and robustness checks and is
in line with the results of Altavilla et al. (2018).
The literature has established three different channels through which non-standard
monetary policies might have an impact on the banking sector: the portfolio
rebalancing channel, the liquidity channel, and the signalling channel. It is likely
that some effects just offset each other. Disentangling these effects is an avenue for
further research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data cleaning
In this section I will explain how the database has been built. Two main statistical
sources have been employed: the Spanish Banking Association and the Spanish Stock
Market Commission (CNMV). From the Spanish Banking Association I have gathered
annual data from the Spanish Banking Industry Statistical Yearbook (SBISY) for
a period that goes from 1999 to 2017. Since the SBISY does not include those
new entities created after 2010, data from the CNMV is employed. This data is
collected from the audits of each bank that were presented to the CNMV each year.
An important feature of this data is that it is presented in both consolidated and
non-consolidated data. Given that some Spanish depository institutions are major
global firms (e.g. Banco Santander or BBVA) and they are therefore exposed to
different markets, non-consolidated data is preferred.
The economic and financial crisis led to a massive restructuring process of the
Spanish banking sector. Some saving banks in trouble were merged to each other in
order to create new entities (e.g. Bankia (merging Caja Madrid, Bancaja, Caja de
Canarias, Caja de Ávila, Caixa Laietana, Caja Segovia and Caja Rioja), Abanca
(merging Caixa Galicia and Caixanova), Liberbank (merging Cajastur, Caja de
Extremadura, Caja de Castilla-La Mancha and Caja de Cantabria), Kutxabank
(Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa, Caja Vital and Kutxa).). The rest were absorbed by the main
Spanish commercial banks (Banco Santander, Banco Popular, BBVA and Banco
Sabadell). Hence, new "virtual-entities" have been constructed adding balance sheets
over the 1999-2017 period in order to control for mergers and acquisitions. Tables
A1 and A2 shows this process in detail. All banks which declared bankruptcy before
2017 have been removed from the sample.
Table A1: Mergers and acquisitions
Main bank Absorbed/acquired bank Year
Banco Santander Banco de Desarrollo Económico Español 2003
Banco de Vitoria 2004
Banco Banif 2013
Banco Español de Crédito (BANESTO) 2013
Banco Popular Banco de Castilla 2008
Banco de Crédito Balear 2008
Banco de Galicia 2008
Banco de Vasconia 2008
Banco de Andalucía 2009
BBVA BBVA Privanzabanco 2003
Banco de Crédito Local de España 2009
Finanzia, Banco de Crédito 2011
Unoe Bank S.A. 2016
Banco Depositario BBVA 2016
Banco Caixa Geral Banco Extremadura 2001
Banco Simeón 2002
Banco Inversis Bancoval Securities Services 2017
Source: Spanish Banking Industry Statistical 2017 Yearbook.
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Table A2: Mergers and acquisitions (Continuation)
Main bank Absorbed/acquired bank Year
Banco Sabadell Soldbank 2001
Banco Herrero 2002
Activobank 2003
Banco de Asturias 2003
Banco Atlántico 2004
Banco Urquijo 2006
Banco CAM 2012*
Caixabank Microbank de la Caixa 2011
Banca Cívica 2012
Banco de la Pequeña y la Mediana Empresa 2012
Banco de Valencia 2013
Barclays Bank 2015
Bankia Caja Madrid 2010*
Bancaja 2010*
Caja de Canarias 2010*
Caja de Ávila 2010*
Caixa Laietana 2010*
Caja Segovia 2010*
Caja Rioja 2010*
Liberbank Cajastur 2011*
Caja de Extremadura 2011*
Caja de Castilla-La Mancha 2011*
Caja de Cantabria 2011*
Abanca Caixa Galicia 2011*
Caixanova 2011*
Kutxabank Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa 2011*
Caja Vital 2011*
Kutxa 2011*
Source: Spanish Banking Industry Statistical 2017 Yearbook. *Data retrieved from the Spanish
Stock Market Commission.
Besides, I have had to keep track of all changes in bank names during the
1999-2017 period. Table A3 show the changes in bank names.
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Table A3: Changes in bank names
Current name Previous name Year*
Allfunds Bank Banco de Sevilla 2000
Aresbank Banco Árabe Español 2008
Banco Caixa Geral Banco Luso Español 2002
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria (BBVA)
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 2000
Banco Cetelem Banco Fimestic 2002
Banco Finantia Sofinloc Banco Esfinge 2002
Banco Inversis Banco Inversis Net 2008
Banco Mediolanum Banco de Finanzas e Inversiones
(FIBANC)
2012
Banco Santander Banco Santander Central Hispano 2007
Bank Degroof Petercam Spain Privat Bank 2008
Credit Suisse AG Credit Suisse 2009
EBN Banco de Negocios Sociedad Española de la Banca de Negocios 2001
Open Bank Patagon Internet Bank and Patagon Bank 2002 and
2005
Renta 4 Banco Banco Alicantino de Comercio 2011
Santander Consumer Finance HBF Banco Financiero 2002
Santander Investment Santander Central Hispano Investment and
Santander Investment Services
2004 and
2006
Targobank Banco Popular Hipotecario 2011
Wizink Bank Bancopopular-e 2016
Source: Spanish Banking Industry Statistical 2017 Yearbook. *Year the name was changed.
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A.2 Descriptive statistics
Table A4 shows the correlation matrix among all both dependent and independent
variables employed in the model.
Table A4: Correlation matrix
Var. ROA PTOIRIMR ESTA EERR SYC BS LTA LD DG MP RGDP INF VSPI MRO
ROA 1.00
PTOIR 0.86 1.00
IMR 0.14 0.23 1.00
ESTA 0.03 -0.03 -0.17 1.00
EERR 0.02 -0.02 -0.12 0.82 1.00
SYC -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.41 0.50 1.00
BS -0.06 -0.07 -0.15 0.11 0.08 0.02 1.00
LTA -0.02 -0.01 0.33 -0.07 -0.09 -0.05 0.30 1.00
LD 0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.12 1.00
DG -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 1.00
MPI -0.02 -0.02 -0.10 0.02 0.03 -0.00 0.70 0.11 -0.03 0.02 1.00
RGDP 0.03 0.07 -0.01 -0.37 -0.12 -0.69 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.08 0.01 1.00
INF -0.05 -0.01 0.11 -0.55 -0.63 -0.51 -0.06 0.07 0.04 -0.03 -0.00 0.21 1.00
VSPI -0.10 -0.09 0.05 0.20 0.09 0.62 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.07 -0.00 -0.64 -0.21 1.00
MRO -0.02 0.04 0.15 -0.74 -0.81 -0.73 -0.07 0.08 0.07 0.00 -0.00 0.30 0.76 -0.18 1.00
Source: Author’s elaboration. Number of observations: 742. Variables → ROA: Return of assets,
PTOIR: Pre-tax operating income ratio, IMR: Interest margin to total assets ratio, ESTA:
Eurosystem total assets, EERR: Excess reserves, SYC: Slope of the yield curve, BS: Bank size,
LTA: Loans to assets ratio, LD: Loans to deposits, DG: Deposits growth, MP: Market power index,
RGDP: Real GDP growth, INF: Inflation, VSPI: Volatility of stock price index, MRO: ECB’s Main
refinancing operations rate.
A.3 Hausman specification test
So as to choose what model fits better with our data, I will apply the Hausman
(1978) specification test. Under the null hypothesis, the Balestra-Nerlove estimator
is consistent and efficient but even though the within-groups estimator is consistent,
it is not efficient (Baltagi, 2008). Therefore, if I do not reject the null hypothesis,
the random effects model will be chosen. On the other hand, under the alternative
hypothesis, the Balestra-Nerlove estimator is inconsistent and the within-groups
estimator is consistent so I will have to employ a fixed effects model. The Hausman
(1978) test computes the difference between the two estimators, weighted by the
inverse of the differences of the variance-covariance matrices of both estimators. It
seems remarkable that the variance-covariance matrices of both estimators should be
positive definite.
As the difference between the variance-covariance matrix of both estimators is
not positive definite in all cases, I will base both variance-covariance matrices on
disturbance variance estimate from the Balestra-Nerlove (efficient) estimator.
Table A5 shows the results of the Hausman (1978) test for the static model
with all bank-specific variables and macroeconomic conditions. The fixed effect
(within-groups) estimator should be used in all models.
Table A6 shows the results of the Hausman (1978) test for the dynamic model.
Again, the fixed effect (within-groups) estimator should be used in all models.
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Table A5: Hausman specification test
ROA PTOIR IMR
Model 3A 3B 3C 6A 6B 6C 9A 9B 9C
χ2(8)* 37.57 37.55 40.52 47.27 43.01 49.84 15.94 17.18 15.41
Prob > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.05
Source: Author’s elaboration. *Degrees of freedom.
Table A6: Hausman specification test
ROA PTOIR IMR
Model 12A 12B 12C 15A 15B 15C 18A 18B 18C
χ2(9)* 83.88 83.33 84.15 96.59 93.82 97.34 207.38 202.44 208.95
Prob > χ2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Source: Author’s elaboration. *Degrees of freedom.
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